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Abstract
In 2008, in the midst of the Global Financial Crisis, America’s Big Three automakers neared
their breaking point. Two of them, General Motors (GM) and Chrysler, asked Congress for
funding to prevent uncontrolled bankruptcies. Policymakers realized these uncontrolled
bankruptcies would damage the manufacturing sector. Congress considered but failed to
pass a framework conditioning short-term financing on the companies’ producing
acceptable restructuring plans. With the companies warning that they could not survive the
coming presidential transition, on December 19, 2008, President George W. Bush announced
the Automotive Industry Financing Program (AIFP) under the authority of the Emergency
Economic Stability Act (EESA) of 2008, which made up to $17.4 billion available to the two
companies. After two extensions to GM, the government would lend a total of $23.8 billion
to GM and Chrysler under this program, funding the companies from late 2008 through their
mid-2009 bankruptcies (the Bridge Loans). This case discusses these Bridge Loans, which
helped the companies survive the presidential transition and begin creating plans to survive
bankruptcy.
Keywords: AIFP, auto finance, bridge loan, Chrysler, EESA, General Motors, nonbanks,
TARP
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Automotive Bridge Loans
At a Glance
In 2008, due to the confluence of the
financial crisis and years of decline, the Big
Three American auto companies—General
Motors (GM), Chrysler, and Ford—began to
experience significant losses and financing
constraints. During the lame duck period of
George W. Bush’s presidency in late 2008,
GM and Chrysler could not find private
funding to sustain their operations. Neither
of the companies had adequate
restructuring plans, and the collapse of the
companies would devastate the larger auto
industry. Congress did not approve aid to
the automakers by winter recess, and it
was clear the companies would not survive
the coming months without government
aid.

Summary of Key Terms
Purpose: To finance the day-to-day operations of
Chrysler and General Motors through the first quarter
of 2009 (the transition period) while ensuring that
the companies begin restructuring themselves
Announcement date

December 19, 2008

Operational date

December 31, 2008

Expiration date

December 31, 2011, for GM
and January 2, 2012, for
Chrysler (July 10, 2009 for
both at the option of the
President’s Designee)

Legal authority

Emergency Economic
Stabilization Act of 2008
(EESA)

Rate

The greater of three-month
LIBOR plus 3%, or 5% plus a
default penalty (adds an
additional 5%)

The Bush administration determined that
the auto companies were eligible for
Senior Liens on all
assistance from the $350 billion first Collateral
unencumbered assets and
tranche of the recently passed Troubled
junior liens on encumbered
Assets Relief Program (TARP). On
assets
December 19, 2008, President Bush Funder
US Department of the
announced up to $17.4 billion in Bridge
Treasury
Loans as part of the Automotive Industry
General Motors Corporation,
Participants
Financing Program (AIFP). These Bridge
Chrysler Holding LLC
Loans became part of a government rescue
$17.4 billion ($13.4 billion
of the auto industry, which involved aid to Initial commitment
for GM and $4 billion for
two automotive finance companies, two
Chrysler)
bankruptcy reorganizations, a warranty
$23.8 billion ($19.8 billion
guarantee program, aid to auto suppliers, Final commitment
for GM and $4 billion for
Department of Energy loans for financing
Chrysler)
the development of fuel-efficient vehicles,
“Cash for Clunkers” (a vehicle scrappage program), and a Small Business Administration
(SBA) dealer floorplan financing program. Although Ford was also impacted by the financial
crisis, it was in a healthier financial position than its peers and chose not to participate in the
AIFP. It did, however, participate in a Department of Energy funding program and financial
assistance programs such as the Commercial Paper Funding Facility (CPFF).
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Many of the terms of the bridge loan agreement closely mirrored those outlined in the Auto
Industry Financing and Restructuring Act, which passed the House on December 10, 2008,
but failed to pass the Senate.
The Bridge Loans sustained the companies while a comprehensive auto industry
restructuring was crafted. They also forced Chrysler and GM to restructure themselves into
viable companies and required them to develop and implement long-term viability plans that
were evaluated by a “car czar,” a role that ultimately fell to a Presidential Task Force.
Summary Evaluation
In that the borrowers did survive the presidential transition and implemented viability
plans, one could argue that the Bridge Loans succeeded. However, the companies did not
produce viable plans by the initial deadline. Some observers have questioned whether
making the auto companies eligible for TARP went beyond the intent of Congress and
whether some of the terms in the loan agreements were effective in protecting taxpayer
funds.
There were also criticisms of the government’s design of and rapid exit from the $4 billion
bridge loan to Chrysler. Treasury relinquished its claim on 40% of Chrysler Financial’s
proceeds for $1.9 billion in May 2010, but some argued that it could have received $600
million more if it had waited until the end of the year (COP 2011, 11).
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Automotive Bridge Loans: United States Context 2007–2008
GDP
$14,681.5 billion in 2007
(SAAR, Nominal GDP in LCU
$14,559.5 billion in 2008
converted to USD)
GDP per capita
$47,976 in 2007
(SAAR, Nominal GDP in LCU
$48,383 in 2008
converted to USD)
As of Q4, 2007:
Fitch: AAA
Moody’s: Aaa
S&P: AAA

Sovereign credit rating
(5-year senior debt)

As of Q4, 2008:
Fitch: AAA
Moody’s: Aaa
S&P: AAA
$9,231.7 billion in total assets in 2007
$9,938.3 billion in total assets in 2008

Size of banking system
Size of banking system as a
percentage of GDP
Size of banking system as a
percentage of financial system

62.9% in 2007
68.3% in 2008
Banking system assets equal to 29.0% of
financial system in 2007
Banking system assets equal to 30.5% of
financial system in 2008

5-bank concentration of banking
system

43.9% of total banking assets in 2007
44.9% of total banking assets in 2008

Foreign involvement in banking
system
Government ownership of banking
system

22% of total banking assets in 2007
18% of total banking assets in 2008
Data not available for 2007
0% of banks owned by the state in 2008

100% insurance on deposits up to
$100,000 in 2007
Existence of deposit insurance
100% insurance on deposits up to
$250,000 in 2008
Sources: Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation; World Bank Bank Regulation and
Supervision Survey; World Bank Global Financial Development Database;
Bloomberg.
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Overview

Background
Rick Wagoner, CEO of General Motors (GM), the largest of America’s Big Three auto
companies (GM, Ford, and Chrysler), first requested emergency funding from the
government on October 13, 2008, a few weeks before the presidential election. However, the
Big Three as a whole had been in dire straits for several years before the financial crisis (Klier
and Rubenstein 2012, 35–36; Paulson 2010, 361). This was largely due to a combination of
declining market share, miscalculated labor arrangements, slim profit margins, and reliance
on gas-guzzling vehicles for profit. These factors left the industry vulnerable (COP 2011, 911; Canis et al. 2009, 1–2). The Big Three had been losing market share in the passenger car
market for more than 20 years and had endured these losses by focusing on trucks and SUVs,
which were more profitable on a per-unit basis (Klier and Rubenstein 2012, 35–36).
However, the Big Three even began losing market share in the truck and SUV segment in the
2000s, sending their overall market share plummeting more than 15% between 2000 and
2008 (Klier and Rubenstein 2012, 35–36). Hurricanes in 2004–2005 exacerbated already
high and volatile fuel prices, further damaging demand for American cars (Canis et al. 2009,
35). Correspondingly, automotive sales for the Big Three declined about 25% between
January and October 2008 (BEA 2019). Chrysler and General Motors, two of the Big Three,
found their cash reserves depleted by combined 2008 losses of $39 billion (GAO 2009, 5).
Chrysler and General Motors faced an extremely weakened competitive position, and
policymakers believed that achieving long-term viability would require fundamental
changes to their products, their organizational structure, and their operations (Rattner 2010,
14–21, 75–81, 91–92, 182–200).
Chrysler and GM’s treasuries could no longer finance some of their most basic day-to-day
operations (Klier and Rubenstein 2012, 36–37; Goolsbee and Krueger 2015, 7; Canis et al.
2009, 7–8).3 Restructuring via bankruptcy was not considered an option because of the
companies’ lack of preparation for the administrative challenges of Chapter 11 and because
the failure of the companies would have major repercussions (Rattner 2010, 59; Klier and
Rubenstein 2013, 146–147). The failure of GM and Chrysler was expected to cost
approximately 1.1 million jobs and the fallout from a failed restructuring would have likely

Unlike Chrysler and GM, Ford had shored up its cash reserves by borrowing $23.5 billion from the private
sector before the financial crisis (in 2006) and initiated a massive restructuring program (Klier and Rubenstein
2012, 3637). Ford was also damaged by the financial crisis, but Ford was extremely hesitant to participate in
the TARP automotive industry restructuring programs. The Ford family was worried about a potential dilution
of their stake in the company coming as a result of their participation in these programs. However, Ford did
participate in other government programs during this time, the Commercial Paper Funding Facility (CPFF), the
Term Asset-Backed Securities Loan Facility (TALF), and the Department of Energy’s Advanced Technology
Vehicle Manufacturing (ATVM) Loan Program in the 20082010 period (Adrian and Schaumburg 2012; Canis
and Yacobucci 2015; Federal Reserve 2009).
3
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“create[d] more panic, and it would [have] crush[ed] auto suppliers and other carmakers”
(Paulson 2010, 424; COP 2011, 11).
After the passage of the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008 (EESA) on October 3,
2008 (which created the Troubled Assets Relief Program [TARP]), the government gained
access to $350 billion to support the financial sector (Canis et al. 2009, 9). However, the Bush
administration was hesitant to use TARP funds for an auto bailout (Rogers 2008a). On
November 17, Senator Harry Reid introduced a bill that would have provided up to $25
billion to fund bridge loans to the auto companies using some of the money allocated to
TARP, but the Bush administration and many members of Congress opposed the effort (Canis
et al. 2009, 42). It failed to progress beyond some introductory remarks in the Senate (Senate
2008.).
Other proposals emanating from Congress also failed. The most notable were the Auto
Industry Financing and Restructuring Act of 2008 (AIFRA) and the request by various
members of Congress for intervention by the Federal Reserve. The AIFRA would have
financed a bailout by reallocating the funds appropriated to a Department of Energy loan
program under the Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007. It was passed in the
House but failed to pass in the Senate (Canis et al. 2009, 12).4 Federal Reserve Chairman Ben
Bernanke all but eliminated the possibility of Fed participation in an auto industry bailout
owing to the companies’ likely inadequate collateral (Federal Reserve 2009; Rogers 2008b).
With action by the Fed and Congress off the table, it became clear that taking executive action
was the only solution available to the Bush administration for both keeping the auto
companies alive for the remainder of the presidential transition period and putting them on
the path to restructuring (Paulson 2010, 416–427).
One day after AIFRA failed, on December 12, 2008, the Bush administration began to publicly
reverse course regarding its position on the use of TARP funds for an auto bailout (Canis et
al. 2009, 9; Paulson 2010, 423–427). On December 19, 2008, President Bush announced
$17.4 billion in TARP-funded loans (the Bridge Loans) to GM and Chrysler, conditioned on a
number of restructuring and burden-sharing conditions (White House 2008). Then, on
December 23, 2008, after consulting with Fed Chairman Bernanke, Treasury Secretary
Henry M. Paulson, Jr., submitted to Congress an official determination (in line with a
provision of EESA that allowed for executive branch designation of “troubled assets”),
legitimizing TARP support for the auto industry (COP 2009b, 71–72; Secretary of Treasury
2008, PDF p. 1–3).

Ford and several upstart automotive companies (for example, Tesla and Fisker) eventually received funding
from the Department of Energy loan program starting in 2009. The US government lent Ford approximately
$5.9 billion under this program (Canis and Yacobucci 2015, 13)
4
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Program Description
Automobile Industry Financing Program (AIFP)
The Automobile Industry Financing Program’s (AIFP)5 Loan and Security Agreements (the
Bridge Loans) were announced on December 19, 2008 (White House 2008). The Bridge
Loans were designed as a stopgap measure to serve two purposes. First, to ensure that GM
and Chrysler survived the presidential transition through the first quarter of 2009 (Paulson
2010, 415–428). Second, to make sure that the companies prepared themselves for
bankruptcy and began restructuring themselves into viable companies in the long term
(Paulson 2010, 427–428).
Chrysler Loan Terms
Treasury advanced secured loans to Chrysler at below-market rates without initiation or
commitment fees (Brunel and Hufbauer 2009, 7). The loans bore the larger of two interest
rates: (1) three-month LIBOR plus 3% or (2) 5%, with a penalty rate in cases of default
(Chrysler and Treasury 2009, PDF pp. 28, 143–145). The loans were for a period of three
years but subject to early termination in the event of default or if the companies failed to
demonstrate a viable restructuring plan by a deadline, as described below (Chrysler and
Treasury 2009, PDF pp. 8, 25, 60) Chrysler’s maximum loan amount was $4 billion (Chrysler
and Treasury 2009, PDF p. 143). The loan to Chrysler provided the company with the
entirety of the promised $4 billion at the closing of its loan on January 2, 2009 (Treasury
2018). The company was to use the proceeds from the loans only for general corporate and
working capital purposes (Chrysler and Treasury 2009, PDF p. 147).
Chrysler Collateral Requirements
Each Treasury Bridge Loan to Chrysler was also secured through a number of senior liens on
all of Chrysler’s unencumbered assets and junior liens on all of Chrysler’s encumbered assets
“to the extent legally and contractually permissible” (Chrysler and Treasury 2009, PDF p.
34–35). Most of Chrysler’s assets were already encumbered, so this protection was limited
(Canis et al. 2009, PDF pp. 57–58; GAO 2009, 20). Treasury also received first priority senior
liens on a portion of Chrysler’s encumbered real estate and parts inventory in connection
with a term in the Bridge Loan that made lending contingent on Chrysler’s creditors pledging
senior liens on those assets to Treasury.
Chrysler Restructuring Plan Requirement

The Bridge Loans for Chrysler and GM were announced before the details of the AIFP, which would become
the overall support program for assistance to the auto industry, were published. When published, on December
31, 2008, the details of the AIFP described the broad parameters that the government would reference in
determining assistance to the industry. By then, the first GM loan had already been executed and the term
sheets for both commitments had been available for at least a week. Although proceeding the published AIFP
guidelines, the Bridge Loans do appear to largely comply with them.
5
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The Bridge Loans to Chrysler required it to submit a Restructuring Plan to the government
by February 17, 2009, outlining how the company intended to achieve viability (Chrysler and
Treasury 2009, PDF pp. 59–60). On the same date, the company also had to submit signed
term sheets certifying progress on securing concessions from the United Auto Workers
(UAW) union and public debt holders.
The Restructuring Plan also had to detail monthly actions through 2010, monthly milestones
through 2010, yearly actions from 2011 to 2014, and yearly milestones from 2011 to 2014.
The company had to submit a Restructuring Plan Report by the March 31, 2009, Certification
Deadline, which would document compliance with the Bridge Loans and the companies’
progress on executing the Restructuring Plan. The Restructuring Plan Report recorded
progress on implementing the Restructuring Plan as well as compliance with the various
burden-sharing conditions imposed by the Bridge Loans.
Throughout the term of the Bridge Loans, Chrysler’s progress on the Restructuring Plan, the
Restructuring Report, and compliance would be administered by the President’s Designee,
“one or more officers from the Executive Branch appointed by the President to monitor and
oversee the restructuring of the US domestic automobile industry” (Chrysler and Treasury
2009, PDF p. 68). If the President did not appoint a Designee, the role fell to the Secretary of
Treasury by default.6 This individual would also operate as a senior administrator with
authority to approve bonuses to senior employees, reject transactions involving over $100
million, approve material changes to the company expense policy, receive required notices
from the borrower, and generally conduct oversight (Chrysler and Treasury 2009, PDF p. 19,
58-61).7
Additional Consideration, Oversight, and DIP Conversion Terms
Under the Bridge Loan to Chrysler, Treasury was to receive additional promissory notes for
6.67% of the $4 billion that Treasury was authorized to disburse to Chrysler (these
promissory notes were called Additional Notes) (Chrysler and Treasury 2009, PDF p. 142145). These Additional Notes carried the same interest rate and terms as the loan (Chrysler
and Treasury 2009, PDF pp. 153–155).
To maintain Treasury oversight, Chrysler had to provide financial and operating disclosures
to Treasury at certain dates to certify compliance with the terms of the loan. These included
weekly “13-week rolling cash forecasts” as well as biweekly reports showing current and
future liquidity needs or upcoming major business changes (Chrysler and Treasury 2009,
PDF pp. 54–56).

President Bush did not appoint a Designee and thus Secretary Paulson assumed these duties for the balance
of the administration. President Barack Obama choose to appoint the Presidential Task Force on the Auto
industry as the Designee, as further discussed in Key Design Decision 14 herein. In this paper, references to the
President’s Designee refer to the respective Designee for the applicable time period (Secretary Paulson from
December 30, 2008, to January 20, 2009, and Secretary Timothy F. Geithner from January 26, 2009, to January
25, 2013 [Chrysler and Treasury 2009, PDF p. 22]).
7 See, for example, Section 1.01 of GM and Treasury 2008, Permitted Investments.
6
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The Bridge Loans included the exclusive right to convert a Bridge Loan into a debtor-inpossession (DIP) loan in the event of a bankruptcy filing (Chrysler and Treasury 2009, PDF
pp. 66–67). Since a bankruptcy filing by either of the companies would threaten the taxpayer
funds, the conversion provision would grant the government a senior priority in any
proceeding.8 The Bridge Loans also included a number of standard contract terms common
in secured loans. These included terms laying out procedures for optional and mandatory
loan prepayments and a restriction on the payment of dividends (Chrysler and Treasury
2009, PDF pp. 29, 146, 150).
Sacrifices in the Chrysler Loan
The terms of each Bridge Loan imposed executive compensation restrictions, debt reduction
requirements, and concessions from the UAW. Executives at Chrysler ultimately became
subject to various types of concessions, including (but not limited to) public displays of
concessions (for example, corporate aircraft divestment) and executive compensation
restrictions similar to those in other EESA programs (Chrysler and Treasury 2009, PDF pp.
58-61).
The Bridge Loans committed Chrysler to make its best efforts to reduce its unsecured public
debt by at least two-thirds (Chrysler and Treasury 2009, PDF p. 60). The concessions from
UAW workers involved significant labor contract modifications and the conversion by the
UAW’s Voluntary Employee Benefits Association (VEBA) of half of its Chrysler debt into
equity (Chrysler and Treasury 2009, PDF pp. 8, 14, 24–26, 60).
GM Loan Terms
The terms of the GM Bridge Loan were largely the same as those offered to Chrysler with
some exceptions. They dealt with the amount of funding available, the timing of funding, how
the loan was secured, and the protection of taxpayer funds differently.
The documents executing the loans to GM initially set the maximum loan amount at $13.4
billion to be spread across three advances (Canis et al. 2009, 13–14; GM and Treasury 2008,
PDF pp. 258–262). Of the total, $4 billion would be advanced immediately after the execution
of the Loan and Security Agreement on December 31, 2008 (similar to Chrysler’s assistance
under the Bridge Loans); $5.4 billion would be advanced on January 16, 2009; and $4 billion
would be advanced on February 17, 2009 (contingent on the Secretary of Treasury’s having
sufficient TARP funds available) (GM and Treasury 2008, PDF pp. 258–262).
GM’s Bridge Loan had similarly broad terms to Chrysler’s, placing senior liens on all
unencumbered assets and junior liens on all unencumbered assets (with the exception of
Debtor-in-possession financing, better known as DIP financing, “provides the debtor-in-possession (or the
trustee in a Chapter 7 case) with sufficient funds to meet continuing expenses while the business is either
reorganized or liquidated. Generally, DIP financing is a post-petition obligation that enjoys a high priority for
being repaid from the bankruptcy estate or under the reorganization plan. In contrast, the government loans
were being made while the companies were still operating outside of bankruptcy protection, and the loans
were pre-petition debts (Canis et al. 2009, 54).
8
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some joint ventures and subsidiaries, which were not included as collateral) (GM and
Treasury 2008, PDF pp. 56–57, 80–81; Consulate General Shanghai 2008). As GM had many
more unencumbered assets than Chrysler did, Treasury was able to secure senior liens on a
number of different assets owned by GM (“cash, inventory, real property, equity in domestic
and foreign subsidiaries, and intellectual property”) (COP 2009b, PDF p. 29). Treasury also
received a secured interest in GM’s associated finance company, GMAC LLC through terms
making lending contingent on the other owners of GMAC LLC pledging that interest to
Treasury (GAO 2009, 20–23; GM and Treasury 2008, PDF pp. 258–265).
The Bridge Loan to GM also contained additional terms intended to protect the taxpayers’
investment. The loan entitled Treasury to receive warrants worth up to 19.99% of its
commitment (GM and Treasury 2008, PDF p. 1). In addition to the capped warrants, Treasury
received Additional Notes along terms consistent with those of the Chrysler Bridge Loan as
described above and shown in Figures 1 and 2 (GM and Treasury 2008, PDF p. 2).9 GM issued
Additional Notes for 6.67% of the initial $13.4 billion commitment less one-third the value
of the warrants already issued (GM and Treasury 2008, PDF p. 2).10
The Bridge Loans also included a prohibition on the issuance of stock that would dilute the
Treasury’s stake upon the exercise of the warrants.
Figure 1: Major Amendments and Advances to GM under the Bridge Loans
Date
Implemented

Governing Document

Type

12/31/2008

Execution of Loan and
Security Agreement (LSA)

Initial
Note/Advance

03/31/2009

1st Amendment to Bridge
Loan – extending the
Certification Deadline to
June 1, 2009, and adjusting
related dates (GM and
Treasury 2008, PDF p. 295)
2nd Amendment to LSA –
providing for the working
capital advance (GM and
Treasury 2008, PDF p. 301)
3rd Amendment to LSA –
providing for the working
capital advance (GM and
Treasury 2008, PDF p. 319)

04/22/2009

05/20/2009

Amounts
Expended
(USD)
$13.4 billion

Date Terminated

07/10/2009
(Converted to
stake in New GM)

N/A

Working
Capital
Advance

$2 billion

07/10/2009
(Converted to
stake in New GM)

Working
Capital
Advance

$4 billion

07/10/2009
(Converted to
stake in New GM)

GM issued Additional Notes as the commitment was increased to $15.4 billion and later to $19.8 billion (GM
and Treasury 2008, PDF pp. 300–321).
10
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05/27/2009

4th Amendment to LSA –
providing for the warranty
advance for the purpose of
capitalizing GM Warranty
and entering into the related
Administration Agreement.
Increased the maximum loan
amount. (Expires 36 months
after warranty program
expires) (GM and Treasury
2008, PDF p. 325)

Nye

Warranty
Advance

$360.6 million

Warranty Advance
Maturity Date

Source: Treasury 2018.

Figure 2: Advances to Chrysler under the Bridge Loans
Date Implemented

Loan

Type

Amounts Expended (USD)

Date Terminated

01/02/2009

Secured Loan to
Chrysler

Bridge Loan

$4 billion

06/10/2009 ($ 500
million transferred to
New Chrysler)
05/14/2010
(Remaining $3.5
billion principal and
interest settled for
$1.9 billion)

Source: Treasury 2018.

Outcomes
Both GM and Chrysler were able to continue operating through the first quarter of 2009.
Under the Bridge Loans, Treasury lent a total of $23.8 billion to the two automakers between
December 2008 and July 2009, $4 billion to Chrysler and $19.8 billion to GM (Treasury
2018). The role of the President’s Designee was filled by the Presidential Task Force on the
Auto Industry (the Task Force), which was created on February 16, 2009
(Knowledge@Wharton 2010; Klier and Rubenstein 2012, 38–39). The day-to-day
administration of the loans was led by an auto team within Treasury (COP 2009b, 10).
On March 30, 2009, Treasury released Determinations of Viability, which stated that neither
company’s plan as submitted by the February 17 deadline was “viable as currently
structured” and that the government could not justify “a substantial new investment” in
either company”; but revised plans could make the companies viable (Treasury 2009a;
Treasury 2009b). Each company was asked to revise, resubmit, and achieve progress on its
targets in a set time to receive further government funding (Treasury 2009b; Treasury
2009a). In response to these Determinations, Treasury offered to amend the Bridge Loans to
extend the deadline that would terminate the loans and to provide the companies with
working capital while they each produced a viable business plan (Treasury 2009d, 1).
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Details of Chrysler Viability Plan Determination
The government announced that Chrysler would be given a 30-day extension of its
Certification Deadline, to May 1, 2009, through an amendment to its loan that offered up to
$500 million in working capital. None of this was drawn (GAO 2009, 13; Treasury 2009d, 1).
The same amendment incorporated changes to EESA enacted by the American Recovery and
Reinvestment Act of 2009 (ARRA)11 and removed the requirement that Chrysler reduce its
unsecured public indebtedness by two-thirds. However, the government, in its March 30
Viability Determination document, argued that a potential partnership with Fiat that could
make Chrysler’s plan viable (Treasury 2009a, 5). If it succeeded in securing such a
partnership deal with Fiat (which had been proposed early in 2009), negotiating a haircut
with its secured creditors, and meeting other stated criteria, it would be able to access up to
$6 billion more in government funds for restructuring and possibly avoid bankruptcy (COP
2009b, 13). If Chrysler failed to seal such a deal, the Bridge Loans would be terminated (COP
2009b, 13).
During April, Chrysler successfully executed a satisfactory partnership arrangement with
Fiat but failed to reach an agreement with its secured creditors (COP 2009a, PDF p. 48). With
$6.9 billion in secured debt weighing on the company, Chrysler began to restructure itself
through a Chapter 11 bankruptcy on April 30, 2009 (King and McCracken 2009). The same
day, Treasury formally accepted Chrysler’s Restructuring Plan as viable (OMB 2009, PDF p.
40).
Details of GM Viability Plan Determination
In its March 30, 2009, Determination of Viability, the government requested that GM develop
and implement a “more aggressive” plan to include “leadership changes” by “working closely
with the Task Force” (COP 2009b, 11; Treasury 2009d, 1). GM partially responded to the
Determination of Viability by firing its Chairman and CEO in favor of two appointees
suggested by Treasury (Rattner 2010, 112–114, 133–137).
GM was given a 60-day extension of its Certification Deadline, to June 1, 2009, and 60 days
of working capital through amendments to the Bridge Loans. The amount of additional funds
made available to GM was not specified in the early press release. It would eventually amount
to $6 billion of working capital disbursed in a $2 billion advance on April 22, 2009, and a $4
billion advance on May 20, 2009 (GAO 2009, 2; Treasury 2018).
GM ultimately underwent a successful restructuring with additional government funds after
submitting an acceptable plan in June 2009 (OMB 2009, 71).
Effect of Bankruptcies
Treasury sustained losses on the bridge loans during the bankruptcies of General Motors and
Chrysler. Treasury did two things that limited losses on the Chrysler Bridge Loans. In July

11

ARRA was the economic stimulus bill passed on February 17, 2009.
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2009, the Treasury and Chrysler amended its Bridge Loan documents as part of a plan to
transition Chrysler’s auto-financing partnership from Chrysler Financial to GMAC (Chrysler
and Treasury 2009, PDF p. 383–401). The amendment required Chrysler to pay Treasury
40% of any distributions Chrysler Holding received from its stake in Chrysler Financial,
including the first $1.375 billion (Chrysler and Treasury 2009, PDF p. 383–401). Treasury
also transferred $500 million of Chrysler’s $4 billion obligation under the Bridge Loans to
Chrysler’s post-bankruptcy organization (New Chrysler) as part of its post-bankruptcy
support of the company. Treasury would have lost $1.6 billion plus interest on the $4 billion
loan to Chrysler, but $500 million of the loan was transferred to New Chrysler and
subsequently repaid (Treasury 2018). In late spring 2010, Cerberus offered Treasury $1.9
billion to settle Chrysler Holding’s debts and facilitate Treasury’s exit from its potential 40%
interest in Chrysler Financial’s proceeds (COP 2011, 16). Cerberus was a private equity
company which had bought Chrysler from its previous owner, Daimler-Chrysler, in 2007.
Chrysler Holding still owed Treasury $3.5 billion under the Bridge Loans and Treasury
wished to exit Chrysler Holding quickly, hoping to recoup some revenues for the taxpayers
(COP 2011, 16). Treasury subsequently accepted the offer on May 17, 2010 (COP 2011, 16).
On December 21, 2010, TD Bank announced that it would buy Chrysler Financial from
Cerberus for about $6.3 billion, which would have resulted in Treasury’s receiving $2.5
billion if it had retained its interests in Chrysler Financial, $0.6 billion more than it received
from Cerberus earlier in the year (COP 2011, 16-17). Chrysler Financial was rebranded as
TD Auto Finance and as of 2019 has continued operating (TD Auto Finance 2015).
It is difficult to determine Treasury’s loss on the $19.8 billion in Bridge Loans to GM, as
Treasury put the Bridge Loans and DIP financing for GM together when they converted them
into equity in New GM (Treasury 2018). While Treasury received $2.1 billion in preferred
shares and 60.8% of New GM’s common shares when they converted the two loans, it is not
clear what portion of the preferred and common shares were allocated to the value of the
Bridge Loans. (See Figure 3.) However, the government sold the last of its GM shares and
exited its investment in GM on December 9, 2013. It recovered $39.7 billion of its total $51.0
billion investment in the company for a loss of $11.3 Billion.
Figure 3-The Government’s Ownership of GM

Source: Treasury 2018.
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Key Design Decisions

1. Legal Authority: The Bridge Loans were authorized under the TARP.
The Bridge Loans were authorized under EESA as part of the AIFP, which was authorized
under the TARP. Although the Bush administration initially argued that EESA did not give it
the authority to use TARP funds for aid to the automotive industry, failure to pass a
legislative solution forced it to pivot (Canis et al. 2009, 9). On December 23, 2008, Secretary
Paulson relied on Sections 101(a)(1), 3(5), and 3(9)(B) of EESA to send an official
determination to Congress (Secretary of Treasury 2008). This determination defined
“certain thrift and other holding companies which are engaged in the manufacturing of
automotive vehicles and the provision of credit and financing in connection with the
manufacturing and purchase of such vehicles” as “financial institutions” pursuant to EESA
and further defined their assets as “troubled assets” eligible for purchase with TARP funds
to promote financial stability (Secretary of Treasury 2008).
During the legal battles associated with GM and Chrysler’s 2009 bankruptcies, the
government had to further justify Secretary Paulson’s determination as being in line with the
intentions of Congress in passing TARP (COP 2009b, 74–76). In one such instance, the
government argued that there was “a certain connection between the automotive
companies’ financing entities and the automotive companies themselves that permits the use
of TARP funds to support the automotive companies, thereby supporting the companies’
financial divisions” (COP 2009b, 74–76). The Congressional Oversight Panel discussed the
validity of the Treasury’s arguments and concluded that the issue “may never be answered
with any finality” because it had not been brought to any court for adjudication (COP 2009b,
79).
The Secretary of Treasury did not mention the potential impact of a GM and/or Chrysler
collapse on public finances. However, two economic advisors to the Obama administration
later said that a Chapter 7 bankruptcy by either company would have transferred billions in
liabilities to the government’s Pension Benefit Guarantee Corporation (PBGC), straining its
resources, threatening the economic security of thousands of retirees, and probably
demanding another taxpayer bailout (Goolsbee and Krueger 2015, 10).
2. The bridge loans were part of a multi-faceted program to assist Chrysler and GM.
Under the auspices of the AIFP, the government would ultimately provide funding to not only
the auto manufacturers but also to other related stakeholders, such as suppliers and
customers. Because of the interdependence of companies in the industry, such aid was
thought necessary to ensure the restructuring plans and survival of the manufacturers.
Assistance was provided to suppliers, to finance companies to maintain financing for new
car purchases, and to special purpose vehicles that guaranteed warranties on new cars. The
government also helped the two companies restructure using the bankruptcy code,
committing billions of dollars in debtor-in-possession and post-petition financing (Klier and
Rubenstein 2013, 148150).
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Treasury argued that the program focused on companies whose disruption could
have a negative effect on financial stability.

Although AIFP was the formal program authorized by and receiving funding under EESA to
assist the auto industry with TARP funds, the program itself served more as a line item that
could encompass Treasury’s various loans and investments in the auto industry within TARP
documentation. The AIFP appeared on the Treasury website weeks after the Bridge Loans
were signed.
Treasury argued that the companies it supported through the AIFP were systemically
important. The overall objective of the AIFP as stated in the program guidelines was: “…to
prevent a significant disruption of the American automotive industry that poses a systemic
risk to financial market stability and will have a negative effect on the real economy of the
United States” (Treasury 2014). Treasury said that it had determined eligibility for the AIFP,
and the Bridge Loans put forward under it, on a case-by-case basis that took several factors
into account (Treasury 2014), including:
•

“The importance of the institution to production by, or financing of, the American
automotive industry;

•

“Whether a major disruption of the institution’s operations would likely have a
materially adverse effect on employment and thereby produce negative effects on
overall economic performance;

•

“Whether the institution is sufficiently important to the nation’s financial and
economic system that a major disruption of its operations would, with a high
probability, cause major disruptions to credit markets and significantly increase
uncertainty or losses of confidence, thereby materially weakening overall
economic performance; and

•

“The extent and probability of the institution’s ability to access alternative sources
of capital and liquidity, whether from the private sector or other sources of US
government funds” (Treasury 2014).

4. The Bridge Loans served to sustain GM and Chrysler through the presidential
transition and forced them to make long-term viability plans.
The Bridge Loans served two purposes. The first was to ensure the survival of GM and
Chrysler through the end of the Bush administration (Paulson 2010, 415–418). The officials
designing the Bridge Loans thought that the transition period would be “a barbarically long
time to be without adequate resources” and that GM in particular was likely to fail by the end
of 2008 without funding assistance from the government since it was experiencing critical
difficulty accessing market funding (Paulson 2010, 415–418).
The second purpose was to force the companies to develop sufficient plans for achieving
long-term viability, a concept directly embodied in the guidelines: “The program will require
steps be taken by participating firms to implement plans that achieve long-term viability.”
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The Paulson Treasury contemplated survival only as it was accompanied by major
restructuring (Paulson 2010, 428).
Achieving long-term viability, however, was complicated by the fact that Chrysler and GM
were not just having liquidity problems. GM was technically insolvent; Chrysler may have
been as well, but as a private company it was not required to publish its financial statements
(Vlasic and Wayne 2008; GM 2009, 140). Companies facing insolvency in ordinary times
would try to raise capital and reorganize through the Bankruptcy Code. However, during the
financial crisis the two companies lacked the financing and the time for a conventional
restructuring (Paulson 2010, 421–424). They would have probably failed to reorganize
through a Chapter 11 bankruptcy and found themselves liquidated in a Chapter 7 bankruptcy
(Klier and Rubenstein 2013, 147).12 Even if the companies managed to survive bankruptcy,
an expedited bankruptcy would have been complicated by negotiations among the
thousands of GM and Chrysler creditors, counterparties, and labor (across multiple
countries). It would certainly take longer than the couple months left in the Bush
administration (Rattner 2010, 59, 62, 107; Goolsbee and Krueger 2015, 9).
Figure 4: Restructuring Plan Principles
Enable “the
Borrower and its
Subsidiaries to
develop a viable
and competitive
business that
minimizes
adverse effects on
the environment”

Enhance “the ability and
the capacity of the
Borrower and its
Subsidiaries to pursue the
timely and aggressive
production of energyefficient advanced
technology vehicles”

Preserve and
promote “the
jobs of
American
workers
employed
directly by the
Borrower and
its Subsidiaries
and in related
industries”13

Safeguard “the
ability of the
Borrower and its
Subsidiaries to
provide
retirement and
health care
benefits for their
retirees and their
dependents”

Stimulate
“manufacturing and
sales of automobiles
produced by the
Borrower and its
Subsidiaries”

Sources: GM and Treasury 2008, PDF p. 52; Chrysler and Treasury 2009, PDF p. 6.

Because officials were concerned that they “would not be around to oversee […] changes” at
the two companies, the Bridge Loans had to “put the automakers on a path to reorganization
through bankruptcy proceedings,” which required intricate restructuring plans to succeed
(Paulson 2010, 428429).14 These restructuring plans were to be based around five principles
(Figure 4). The Paulson Treasury (and later the Geithner Treasury) knew that GM and
There was also some skepticism as to whether any automaker, no matter their previous strength, would be
able to survive a bankruptcy (Rattner 2010). A major reason for the skepticism was the belief that consumers
wouldn’t buy vehicles from a bankrupt company out of concern that their warranties would not be honored
(Rattner 2010).
13 Boldface is used here to indicate the fact that policymakers emphasized this principle.
14 Although sources indicate that officials contemplated using bankruptcy as a tool as early as late December
2008 when the Bridge Loans were put in place, this term was not included in official announcements about the
AIFP until March 31, 2009 (Paulson 2010, 421–428; Treasury 2009d, 1). This may indicate the willingness to
avoid bankruptcy if possible; however, given the market conditions and the conditions of the companies this
appeared a limited possibility (Krolicki 2009).
12
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Chrysler were having difficulty producing realistic plans and might not do so voluntarily
(Rattner 2010, 27–32).
On March 30, 2009, Treasury determined that the companies’ submitted plans were not
viable and began directly collaborating with them to produce new ones (Treasury 2009a;
Treasury Department 2009b). The modified plans were ultimately approved by the
government and carried the companies through Chapter 11.
5.

The Bridge Loans were administered by Treasury.

As a part of the AIFP, which itself was part of TARP, the Bridge Loans were administered by
a team in Treasury’s Office of Financial Stability (Treasury 2014). Treasury’s auto team drew
upon the few automobile industry experts in the federal government but was largely
composed of restructuring and bankruptcy experts. The team was “was notable for not
including any individual with close ties to the auto industry” (Klier and Rubenstein 2012,
39). The primary reason for this seems to be that the auto rescue was considered a privateequity-style restructuring deal, which tends to rely on non-sectoral financial and bankruptcy
expertise (Rattner 2010).
6.

The loans had three-year terms but included significant provisions that would
trigger early maturation.

The Bridge Loans were scheduled to mature at the earlier of the expiration date, which was
in approximately three years unless other designated events occurred sooner: the
occurrence of certain standard acts of default at the Lender’s option such as any “Change of
Control [occurring] without the prior consent of” Treasury, or the President’s Designee failed
to issue a Plan Completion Certification (PCC) after their respective closing dates of
December 30, 2011, and January 2, 2012 (Chrysler and Treasury 2009, PDF p. 143; GM and
Treasury 2008, PDF pp. 112, 258). The loans tied their maturity to each company’s
restructuring progress.
Each loan would mature three years after execution if the President’s Designee signaled
acceptance of the company’s viability plan by issuing a PCC by the March 31, 2009, deadline
or any permitted extension (GM and Treasury 2008, PDF pp. 67, 71, 106; Chrysler and
Treasury 2009, PDF pp. 21, 25, 60). However, the Bridge Loans would terminate on April 30
if the stakeholders could not reach an agreement by March 31. In that case, a company would
be obliged to repay all advances and any interest and fees due under the agreement (GM and
Treasury 2008, PDF pp. 67, 71, 74, 106; Chrysler and Treasury 2009, PDF pp. 21, 25, 60).
This was provision that could exert extra pressure on the stakeholders to achieve a
compromise.
The Fact Sheet accompanying the announcement of the Bridge Loans stated that “all funds
[would be] returned to the Treasury Department” when the loan was called in the event that
a firm did not attain viability by the deadline (White House 2008). This suggests that some
believed the companies had the capacity to repay the loans, implying that taxpayers would
not lose money on the Bridge Loans if the companies failed to demonstrate viability.
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However, given the high possibility of bankruptcy, there could be no certainty that even if
repaid, the amounts would not be recaptured by the court as preferences.15
7.

Treasury committed to lend GM and Chrysler an aggregate $17.4 billion but $4
billion was contingent on the release by Congress of the final tranche of TARP
funds.

Loan size was a central consideration for the Bush administration (Deese, Shafran, and Jester
2020, 363–368). Proposals for financing the two companies varied from a $10 billion GM
loan to a $25 billion loan program for both companies, as there was significant uncertainty
as to how much money the companies needed to stay alive (Deese, Shafran, and Jester 2020,
363–368). As announced on December 19, 2008, Treasury initially committed to lend $17.4
billion in short-term financing to GM and Chrysler through the Bridge Loan program, but $4
billion of this was not to be available until February 2009 and was “contingent upon drawing
down the final tranche of TARP funds” (White House 2008). The initial White House
announcement did not allocate specific amounts to the two companies (White House 2008).
Notwithstanding the contingency related to the $4 billion third advance to GM, the GM Bridge
Loan Agreement was written with a maximum commitment of $13.4 billion to be paid to the
company in three advances. The first $4 billion advance was paid on execution of the loan
agreement (GM and Treasury 2008, PDF p. 262). The $5.4 billion second advance, which also
relied on the first $350 billion tranche of TARP, was paid to the company on January 16, 2009
(GM and Treasury 2008, PDF p. 261; COP 2009b, 9). The third $4 billion advance to GM was
scheduled for February 17, 2009, and was made conditional on the release by Congress of
the second tranche of TARP funds or on Treasury’s finding another source of funds (White
House 2008).16 While GM did need an immediate $4 billion advance to survive through the
New Year, it is not clear why Treasury divided the loan to GM into three advances rather than
two. It is also unclear why the date of the second advance to GM was set for January 16, 2009,
beyond the fact that it would happen before the inauguration on January 20, 2009.
Treasury allocated Chrysler $4 billion in loans out of the original funding commitment and
Chrysler received this amount upon execution of the loan agreement on December 31, 2008
(Treasury 2018).

15 A

“preference” is a payment made by a debtor within some short period before filing for bankruptcy and may
be voided and added back into the estate because the debtor here has acted in preference to certain creditors
over other similarly situated or superior creditors, contrary to the bankruptcy code’s main tenet of treating
similarly situated creditors equally. See Section 547(b) of the US Bankruptcy Code.
16 The loan agreement addresses the contingency this way: “The Advance made on the Third Draw Date shall
be in an amount equal to $4,000,000,000; provided, that notwithstanding anything to the contrary herein, the
Lender’s obligation to make such Advance is conditioned on either (x) the Secretary of the Treasury’s authority
to purchase additional Troubled Assets being increased as set forth in Section 115(a)(3) of EESA or (y) the
availability to the Secretary of the Treasury of other funding for financial assistance to the automotive industry
under Applicable Law” (GM and Treasury 2008, PDF p. 262).
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The amount of funding authorized by Treasury for the Bridge Loans was
increased and the term of the loans were extended.

On March 31, 2009, the Obama administration released its Determinations of Viability, which
recognized that the two companies would not be able to provide viable restructuring plans
by the Bridge Loan deadline (April 30, 2009). However, the Obama administration judged
that the companies were well on their way to completing satisfactory viability plans, so they
amended both of the Bridge Loans to provide the companies with more time to submit the
plans and committed the necessary working capital to sustain the companies in the
meantime. It extended GM’s deadline by 60 days, to June 1, 2009, and extended Chrysler’s
deadline by 30 days, to May 1, 2009 (GM and Treasury 2008, PDF p. 296; Chrysler and
Treasury 2009, PDF p. 274). Treasury committed to supporting General Motors for 60 days
and Chrysler for 30 days (Treasury 2009d, 1). Treasury correspondingly increased the
amount of funding for GM by $2 billion on April 22, 2009, and added a further $4 billion in
available funding on May 20, 2009 (Treasury 2018). Treasury also made $500 million in
additional working capital available to Chrysler, but Chrysler did not take advantage of that
offer. However, there was no such increase in funding for Chrysler, as it does not appear that
Chrysler requested it (Treasury 2018). The 4th amendment to the loan agreement on May 27,
2008 (see Figure 1) increased the maximum loan amount by $360 million to $19.8 billion.
9.

The additional working capital loans contained further restrictions.

The first $17.4 billion to GM was to be used for “general corporate and working capital
purposes,” but the amended loans providing the $4 billion and $2 billion working capital
further restricted the use of funds (GM and Treasury 2008, PDF pp. 301–307, 319–321).
These amendments specified that the additional funds would be for only “working capital
purposes” and would require a “Use of Proceeds Statement” to accompany each new request
for working capital (GM and Treasury 2008, PDF pp. 301–307, 319–321). By restricting
financing to “working capital” and requiring that the companies submit a detailed
description of how a requested advance would be used, the Bridge Loan documents provided
Treasury with an avenue for controlling the minutiae of what the emergency financing would
be spent on. This did impose a larger administrative burden, but these new conditions were
to affect GM for only 60 days or less, after which GM would enter bankruptcy (Klier and
Rubenstein 2012, 42).
10. The loans carried favorable interest rates and no fees, but they had significant
terms that would trigger penalty interest rates.
Each loan set the interest rate at the largest of (i) the three-month LIBOR rate as of December
2, 2008 plus 3.00%, or (ii) 5.00% (Chrysler and Treasury 2009, PDF pp. 8, 142–146; GM and
Treasury 2008, PDF pp. 74, 258–263). These were seen as significantly below market rates
(Brunel and Hufbauer 2009, PDF p. 7). In cases of default, the loan documents imposed a
5.00% interest rate increase as a penalty. The loans did not charge standard fees, such as a
commitment fee.
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11. The Bridge Loans were secured using liens.
Treasury sought first priority liens on all unencumbered assets and junior priority liens on
encumbered assets “to the extent legally and contractually permissible” (Canis et al. 2009,
PDF pp. 57–58; GM and Treasury 2008, PDF pp. 80–81). While GM had a relatively large
amount of unencumbered assets, Chrysler had already encumbered most of its assets with
senior liens in two previous secured loans (GAO 2009, 20). Treasury supplemented this with
terms that gave it access to senior liens on some of Chrysler’s already encumbered assets,
which involved making the loan contingent on Chrysler’s creditors pledging their senior liens
on a number of assets to Treasury (Chrysler and Treasury 2009, PDF pp. 142–143, 147–148).
However, Treasury was able to receive first priority senior liens on only a small portion of
Chrysler’s encumbered real estate and parts inventory, which had a recovery value between
$149 million and $261 million (GAO 2009, 20).
The GM Bridge loan was secured by a pledge of “a Lien on and security interest in all of its
rights, title and interest in and to all personal property and real property wherever located
and whether now or hereafter existing and whether now owned or hereafter acquired, of
every kind and description, tangible or intangible” (GM and Treasury 2008, PDF p. 80). In
practical terms there was much more in the way of unencumbered assets that could serve as
collateral to protect Treasury’s loan to GM, which resulted in Treasury’s obtaining first
priority senior liens on much of the collateral, “cash, inventory, real property, equity in
domestic and foreign subsidiaries, and intellectual property,” and junior priority liens on
collateral subject to a Senior lien permitted under the agreement (GM and Treasury 2008,
PDF p. 80; GAO 2009, 20). GM told the GAO that the assets it had provided to the Treasury as
collateral would have been sufficient to support similar funding from commercial lenders in
normal times but did not provide data to support that statement. Treasury said it could not
put a dollar value on the collateral it accepted from the two companies because of volatile
market conditions (GAO 2009, 20).
GM was able to use the common and preferred shares it held in its finance company
subsidiary, GMAC LLC, as collateral for the Bridge Loan. This required the consent of GMAC’s
other shareholders, who included GMAC senior executives and an affiliate of Cerberus, a
private equity fund. (GM and Treasury 2008, PDF p. 265).
In March 2009, when the Obama administration amended its loans with the two companies,
neither amendment improved Treasury’s position among the creditors or expanded
Treasury’s access to collateral ( GM and Treasury 2008, PDF p. 296; Chrysler and Treasury
2009, PDF p. 274). It would have been difficult for the Treasury to expand its access to
collateral, as Treasury had already secured as much collateral as it legally could on the Bridge
Loans (GAO 2009, 20). There is little chance that there were any assets unencumbered, and
newly generated or acquired assets were already automatically covered by pledge (GM and
Treasury 2008, PDF p. 80; Chrysler and Treasury 2009, PDF p. 34–35).
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12. Treasury received warrants to purchase shares in GM and additional promissory
notes from both companies as further compensation for the financial risks it
assumed.
Under the law that created TARP, Treasury was mandated to receive some type of warrant
or some other type of additional security as consideration. The warrant and additional note
policies in the Bridge Loans were more complex than other TARP programs in that the
government received both warrants and additional security.17
In the case of Chrysler, which was privately held, Treasury received additional promissory
notes (Additional Notes) for 6.67% of the “Maximum Loan Amount” (in other words, the $4
billion committed to Chrysler) (Chrysler and Treasury 2009, PDF p. 142). This meant that
Chrysler would owe roughly $4.3 billion in total on the $4 billion it borrowed from Treasury.
In the case of GM, which was publicly traded, Treasury received a warrant to purchase
common shares equal to 20% of the “Maximum Loan Amount” ($13.4 billion) based on the
average closing price of the company’s stock during the 15 days ending December 2, 2008.
The number of shares could be adjusted to limit dilution (GM and Treasury 2008, PDF p. 2).
The Bridge Loans capped Treasury’s stake at 19.99% of GM’s total common equity prior to
the exercise of the warrants. If that provision prevented Treasury from purchasing common
shares equal to a full 20% of the Maximum Loan Amount, Treasury would receive an
additional promissory note similar to Chrysler’s. This Additional Note would be in an amount
equal to 6.67% of the Maximum Loan Amount minus one-third the value of the common
shares Treasury had received on the exercise of the warrants (GM and Treasury 2008, PDF
p. 2).
It is not clear why December 2, 2008, was chosen as the reference date but December 2 was
the date that lawmakers requested the submission of Restructuring Plans from the
automakers during the hearings that preceded the drafting (and eventual failure) of AIFRA
(Kim 2008).
The Congressional Hearings in the weeks before the bailout as well as the past use of
warrants can better illustrate the reasoning behind the warrant requirement and the
exception for private companies. In the 1980s, the government was able to achieve a return
to taxpayers on its 1979 Chrysler loan guarantee by including 14.4 million warrants to buy
Chrysler stock for $13 per share until 1990, which the government sold back to Chrysler for
$311 million in 1983 (General Accounting Office 1984, 1617, 2930). However, the warrants
would protect taxpayers only if the businesses did not fail, there was a market for the
warrants, or the stock value exceeded the warrant exercise price.

See EESA 2008, Sec. 113(d). This requirement emerged from various lessons learned from bailouts of the
late 1970s. Namely, that the government could obtain risk compensation for its aid through equity
participation; for example, receiving warrants, as it did in its support for Chrysler in the late 1970s. In that
circumstance, the government, which had guaranteed certain Chrysler borrowing and received warrants for its
assistance, ultimately sold the warrants back to the company at a profit (General Accounting Office 1984, v-vi).
17
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In a hearing before the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, Senator
Tom Carper made a case that the government should “do warrants […] or something akin to
warrants” that would provide some kind of benefit to the taxpayers for the substantial risk
of rescuing the struggling automaker, but he was unsure of how to do this for privately held
companies like Chrysler (Senate Banking Committee 2008, 86). The reasoning for Senator
Carper’s sentiment may be that “valuing a warrant in a private company is difficult” (Schiffer
and Fraley 2008, PDF p. 5). Receiving Additional Notes avoided these difficulties while
preserving a benefit to taxpayers in the case that the companies did not fail.
Each time that Treasury increased the Maximum Loan Amount (the two successive
amendments to the GM loans that increased the amount by $2 billion and $4 billion,
respectively), Treasury received warrants and Additional Notes in related amounts (GM and
Treasury 2008, PDF p. 300–321). These warrants and notes were effectively the only
financial security, beyond the interest payments, that the government received in return for
extending the term of and the authorized amount loaned to GM.
13. Treasury’s $4 billion Bridge Loan to Chrysler was backed by unencumbered
collateral held by Chrysler Holding, but the only unencumbered collateral with
apparent value was the 40% share in Chrysler Financial’s future distributions.
When contemplating an exit from Chrysler Financial, Treasury did limited due diligence and
“relied primarily on a valuation premised on the wind-down assumption” (COP 2011, 11).
Under the wind-down assumption, Chrysler Financial would remain in survival mode,
originating as few new auto loans as possible and shrinking operations to pay off outstanding
liabilities. By restricting themselves to a wind-down assumption, Treasury rejected the
possibility that Chrysler Financial had much value as a going concern when it sold its interest
to Cerberus later that year. While Treasury received $1.9 billion, more than what the
company was worth under the wind-down assumption, this proved to be $600 million less
than the $2.5 billion that Treasury would have netted when the firm was sold to TD Bank
Group if it had retained such interest and if the parties had agreed to similar terms (COP
2011, 11).
Treasury described this exit as receiving “less than face value [, but] significantly more than
the Treasury expected to recover on this loan and […] greater than an independent valuation
of the loan” (Treasury 2010). They explained the low expectations by pointing to “the
uncertainty regarding the amount and timing of any income distributions by Chrysler
Financial that would be applied to the loan” (Treasury 2010). In the same press release,
Treasury gave the public some good news: it announced that “total TARP repayments now
stand at $189 billion—well ahead of last fall’s repayment projections for 2010” (Treasury
2010).
14. Each company was compelled to submit a detailed Restructuring Plan by
February 17, 2009, including five specific outcomes.
The Bridge Loans’ Restructuring Plan requirements were designed to fulfill the second
purpose of the program: to force GM and Chrysler to make the plans needed to survive both
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bankruptcy proceedings and the long-term aftermath of those proceedings. The Bush
administration did not have the political capital or the time to design and effect a complete
restructuring of the companies but wanted to ensure that the Obama administration would
have a foundation on which to build a long-term solution (Paulson 2010, 425–428).
The mid-February due dates for the Restructuring Plans and the March 31 Certification
Deadline18 imposed short timelines on the automakers to secure concessions.19 This would
have conceivably put pressure on the stakeholders in GM and Chrysler to participate in
developing sufficient Restructuring Plans, since an unsatisfactory plan would have
terminated the Bridge Loans and likely would have led to the companies’ bankruptcies (GM
and Treasury 2008, PDF p. 296; Chrysler and Treasury 2009, PDF p. 274).20
To ensure that the restructuring plans would actually force GM and Chrysler to make the
required preparations for a successful bankruptcy, the Bush administration set down five
outcomes the plans would have to achieve.21 Although the loan agreements did not
differentiate between the criteria, other commentators (such as the Congressional Oversight
Panel) have pointed out that they seem to fit into two categories: (i) conditions pushing the
restructuring to advance US energy policy, and (ii) conditions describing the business
aspects of a successful restructuring.

Although the plans were submitted in February, there is evidence that the companies continued to negotiate
with their stakeholders to improve their plans after that date.
19 The short deadlines dovetailed with Treasury Secretary Paulson’s desire to “make it difficult for President
Obama to avoid [restructuring through bankruptcy]” (Paulson 2010). However, the deadlines could have easily
been altered by the Obama administration through amendments to the Bridge Loan documents. Additionally,
the March 31 Certification Deadline had an impact on negotiations because negotiations continued from the
Determination of Viability through the April 30, 2009, bankruptcy filing (see Kolka 2009, 37).
20 This was not the case, as the Obama administration determined that the Restructuring Plans submitted in
February were not viable by March 30, 2009, and that the companies would not be able to produce viable
restructuring plans within the one-month deadline extension (to April 30, 2009) originally allowed by the
Bridge Loans.
21 In full, Section 7.20 of the GM Agreement describes the outcomes as follows:
(i) Repayment of all Advances, together with all interest thereon and reasonable fees and out-of-pocket
expenses of the Lender accruing under the Loan Documents, and any other financing extended by the
United States Government under all applicable terms and conditions;
(ii) Ability of the Borrower and its Subsidiaries to (x) comply with applicable federal fuel efficiency and
emissions requirements, and (y) commence domestic manufacturing of advanced technology vehicles,
as described in section 136 of the Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007 (Public Law 110-140;
42 U.S.C. 17013);
(iii) Achievement by the Borrower and its Subsidiaries of a positive net present value, using reasonable
assumptions and considering all existing and projected future costs, including repayment of all
Advances, together with all interest thereon and reasonable fees and out-of-pocket expenses of the
Lender accruing under this Loan Agreement, and any other financing extended by the United States
Government;
(iv) Rationalization of costs, capitalization, and capacity with respect to the manufacturing workforce,
suppliers and dealerships of the Borrower and its Subsidiaries; and
(v) A product mix and cost structure that is competitive in the United States marketplace.
18
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This first category contains a single outcome, which was compliance with environmental
requirements and the production of more green vehicles (defined as Advanced Technology
Vehicles in line with the Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007).
This second category contains the other four outcomes:
•

the repayment of all financing from the US government,

•

the achievement of a positive net present value,

•

a competitive product mix and cost structure competitive in the US, and

•

the rationalization of manufacturing workforce, supplier, and dealership costs,
capitalization, and capacity.

The last outcome targeted the costs, capitalization, and capacity of the “manufacturing
workforce, suppliers and dealerships.” While the achievement of a positive net present value
and the ability to repay the government funding were considered more easily measurable
outcomes, the other outcomes depended on concepts that were less clearly defined (GAO
2009, 16). Achievement of these more objectively measurable outcomes became what
Treasury referred to as “Financial Viability,” which became its most important indicator of
long-term viability (COP 2009b, 9). Some outcomes may have been at odds with those
quantifiable financial viability measures; at least in the short term, in particular, the financial
costs of producing green vehicles would likely exceed the revenues generated (Government
Accountability Office 2009, 16).
Under the Bridge Loans, the President’s Designee would receive the Restructuring Plan to be
submitted by February 17, 2009, as well as the Restructuring Plan Report to be submitted
no later than March 31, describing progress made under the plan (GM and Treasury 2008,
PDF p. 106). Then, the President’s Designee would judge the viability of the company in
question, based on the Restructuring Plan Report and the Restructuring Plan, and
subsequently decide whether to issue a Plan Completion Certification (PCC) by the
Certification Deadline of March 31. If the President’s Designee issued the PCC by the
Certification Deadline, the loans would continue in effect until their expiration dates of
December 30, 2011 (for GM) and January 2, 2012 (for Chrysler)(Chrysler and Treasury 2009,
PDF p. 143; GM and Treasury 2008, PDF p. 258). If the President’s Designee did not issue the
PCC by the Certification Deadline, the loan would automatically accelerate, becoming due in
30 days and most likely forcing the company into bankruptcy. This Certification Deadline
could be extended for up to 30 days by the President’s Designee without having to amend
the Bridge Loan (GM and Treasury 2008, PDF p. 296; Chrysler and Treasury 2009, PDF p.
274).
15. The restructuring process was originally to be headed by a car czar, but this was
revised by the Obama administration.
The Bush Administration envisioned that there would be a single President’s Designee
(informally approved by then president-elect Obama) appointed by President Bush to
oversee the loans. However, senior staffers from the Obama transition team instead opted
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for a “one president at a time” approach and declined to participate in this selection (Rattner
2010, 32–35). Therefore, the role of President’s Designee reverted to the Secretary of the
Treasury. Additionally, public opinion on the prospect of a car czar was negative and
remained so for the first month of the Obama administration (Rattner 2010, 32–33, 51–56,
63–66).
President Obama announced that the role would be filled by the Presidential Task Force on
the Auto Industry on February 16, 2009 (a day before the deadline for submitting the
Restructuring Plans) (Klier and Rubenstein 2013, 146–147). This was legitimized by the fact
that the Bridge Loan documents did not specify that the President’s Designee had to be one
person (Chrysler and Treasury 2009, PDF p. 22; GM and Treasury 2008, PDF p. 68). This
Presidential Task Force was co-chaired by the Secretary of Treasury and the Director of the
National Economic Council in the Office of the President (Klier and Rubenstein 2013, 146–
147). However, the day-to-day administration of the Bridge Loans and the staffing for the
Presidential Task Force fell to the Treasury auto team, which was led by two appointed
advisers that reported to the Presidential Task Force, Ron Bloom and Steven Rattner (COP
2009A, 10-11; Klier and Rubenstein 2012, 38-39; Knowledge@Wharton 2010).22
Just as envisioned by the Bush administration, the collective President’s Designee did enjoy
wide-ranging administrative leverage over the restructuring process through its ability to
review a number of company actions and its power to trigger the loan’s termination by
determining the company’s viability (Chrysler and Treasury 2009, PDF pp. 19, 58–61, 68).
Specifically, the Designee had the authority to approve bonuses to senior employees, reject
transactions involving over $100 million, approve material changes to the company expense
policy, receive required notices from the borrower, and generally conduct oversight
(Chrysler and Treasury 2009, PDF pp. 19, 58–61, 68).
Throughout the term of the Bridge Loans, the President’s Designee (who would be the
Secretary of Treasury if the President did not select a Designee) would administer the
companies’ pathways to viability, Restructuring Plans, Restructuring Reports, and
compliance (Chrysler and Treasury 2009, PDF pp. 19, 58–61, 68).
16.

The Bridge Loans required significant concessions from stakeholders.

The Bridge Loans spread the burden of the restructuring process among GM and Chrysler
stakeholders and required concessions from, or imposed limitations on, executives and
management, employees and retirees (largely represented by the UAW), unsecured public
debtholders, and secured creditors. The union employees and retirees and secured and
unsecured debtholders represented most of the companies’ long-term liabilities and would
need to make concessions if the companies were to be viable in the long run. Sacrifices for

Ron Bloom was an investment banker who came from a labor background and was, “in effect, the United
Steelworkers’ chief restructuring officer” in the late 1990s (Rattner 2010, 56). Rattner came from a private
equity background and had been considered by the Obama administration to be the leader of the team
(Geithner 2014, 258-262).
22
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executives and management aimed to reduce the moral hazard associated with the bailout
(Knowledge@Wharton 2010).
The Restructuring Plan mandated that management use its best efforts to achieve certain
restricting targets including “reduction of the outstanding unsecured public indebtedness
(other than with respect to pension and employee benefits obligations) . . . by not less than
two-thirds,” implementation of certain significant labor modifications, and implementation
of certain Voluntary Employee Benefits Association (VEBA) modifications (GM and Treasury
2008, PDF p. 106).
Labor and VEBA Modifications
The labor modifications were aimed at making GM and Chrysler workers’ compensation and
work rules competitive, by December 31, 2009, with those of employees at US locations of
Japanese auto companies (Japanese Transplants).23 This included reductions in
compensation, elimination of any compensation to laid off, fired, furloughed, or idled
employees other than customary severance pay, and modification of work rules for
employees so that rules applied were competitive with those for employees of Japanese
Transplants. The VEBA Modifications required GM and Chrysler to convince the UAW’s
Voluntary Employee Benefits Association to accept at least half of its future contributions
from GM and Chrysler in the form of company shares (GM and Treasury 2008, PDF p. 72).
Other government bailouts during the crisis did not explicitly place these kinds of burdens
on workers, nor did they focus their efforts on protecting workers.24 However, labor costs in
the auto industry were a significant element that had often been criticized. According to
Goolsbee and Krueger (2015), the state of compensation, work rules, and benefit costs
(pensions and health care) had made American auto companies uncompetitive with
Japanese foreign transplants in the US. They note that the “average labor costs for the Big
Three were almost 45 percent higher” than for foreign transplants. From this, they inferred
that a successful auto rescue would have had to have “reduced fixed costs associated with
retirees and the uncompetitive compensation levels for existing workers” (Goolsbee and
Krueger 2015, 8).

According to the GM and Treasury Loan Agreement, “’Compensation Reductions’ shall mean, with respect to
the Borrower or any Subsidiary, the reduction of the total amount of compensation, including wages and
benefits, paid to its United States employees so that, by no later than December 31, 2009, the average of such
total amount, per hour and per person, is an amount that is competitive with the average total amount of such
compensation, as certified by the Secretary of the United States Department of Labor, paid per hour and per
person to employees of Nissan Motor Company, Toyota Motor corporation, or American Honda Motor Company
whose site of employment is in the United States” (See GM and Treasury 2008, Sec. 1.01; also see “Labor
Modifications,” “Severance Rationalization,” and Work Rule Modifications).
24 Government aid for firms like Bear Stearns and AIG did not include any provisions explicitly impacting the
compensation, benefits, pensions and work rules of employees other than executives and management
(although there may have been some incidental impact through management decisions) (Wiggins et al. 2021).
Further, the terms of the conservatorships and Treasury aid to Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac provided for
oversight of executive, but not nonexecutive, compensation.
23
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By contrast, in some other automobile bailouts, such as the €7 billion ($8.96 billion) French
government aid to Renault, Peugeot, and Citroën, the manufacturers were required to keep
their domestic factories operating and protect domestic automotive manufacturing jobs
while making no mention of employee concessions (Speer 2009).25
Reduction of Unsecured Debt
GM had unsecured public debt of about $27 billion (COP 2009b, PDF p. 124). Chrysler’s
unsecured public debt was more limited (GAO 2009, 36–37). The companies were required
to make their best efforts to reduce their unsecured public indebtedness by two-thirds via a
“Bond Exchange and other appropriate means” (GM and Treasury 2008, PDF p. 106). These
terms were meant to make it easier for the companies to impose sacrifices on unsecured
public debt holders.
When facing intransigence from unsecured creditors, the President’s Designee could
threaten to determine the company unviable, plunging the company into bankruptcy, which
would likely impose severe haircuts on, if not entirely wipe out. these unsecured liabilities
(GAO 2009, 36–37; Canis et al. 2009, 14–15). However, this threat would only be effective at
reducing public indebtedness so long as the general public believed it was still possible to
avoid bankruptcy. Since the expectation that the companies would restructure through
bankruptcy appeared in Treasury announcement as early as December 2008 (Paulson 2010,
415–428), Treasury might have had to have kept this intention a secret through a
presidential transition and three months of negotiating for the requirement to be realistic.
Differentiating them from the bailouts of industrial companies throughout the 1970s, the
Bridge Loans did not require or incentivize state or local governments to share the burden
of financing the restructuring (General Accounting Office 1984, 44). 26 Another significant
difference from the 1970s bailouts was that the Bridge Loans did not differentiate between
foreign and domestic creditors when it came to burden sharing. During the 1979 Chrysler
bailout, Treasury negotiated one set of concessions from the 15 largest American bank
lenders and different set of concessions from a committee of Japanese and European bank
lenders (Reich and Donahue 1985, 245).
17.

Supplier companies and dealerships were not initially bailed out and were not
asked to make any specific concessions in the Bridge Loans.

Unlike the French government’s bailout of its auto sector, aid under the Bridge Loans did not
extend to suppliers and dealerships; nor did it seek concessions from such stakeholders
(Speer 2009). This is not in line with the General Accounting Office’s 1984 recommendation
that, “Suppliers whose main or only customer is the distressed firm or municipality should
make financial concessions” (43). The substantive elements of the Bridge Loans ignored

At an EUR-USD exchange rate of 1.28;1
In previous bailouts, these [state and local governments] governments supported the restructuring process
by “lower[ing] taxes, offer[ing] loans and industrial revenue bonds, decreas[ing] regulatory burdens, or
offer[ing] other advantages that increase the recipient's cash flow and improve its prospects” (1984).
25
26
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suppliers and dealerships, even though some of the proceeds of the loans would likely pay
various debts owed to suppliers and dealerships.
Debates over the auto rescue in the Senate also mentioned suppliers and dealerships
(alongside management, labor, and creditors) as two parties that would make concessions
(Senate Banking Committee 2008, 7). Rattner (2010), however, notes that from a very early
stage, restructuring would have entailed the reduction of dealerships. Instead of explicitly
requiring dealership closures in the Bridge Loans, there appears to have been an expectation
that dealership reductions would occur organically (59, 194).
Treasury eventually did provide aid to the suppliers under a program separate from the
Bridge Loans, but not immediately (COP 2009b, 22). It is not clear why the government did
not initially take a more comprehensive approach to assisting the auto industry, including
suppliers and dealers, as some other countries did, or immediately extend benefits to
struggling suppliers instead of waiting until March 19, 2009, to announce an auto supplier
program (COP 2009b, 29). As for the issue of the dealerships, GM and Chrysler eventually
did shrink their dealership networks in the aftermath of the respective bankruptcies
(Goolsbee and Krueger 2015, 17–18).
18.

The Bridge Loans addressed moral hazard by imposing more stringent
restrictions on executives and senior employees than those imposed on most
financial institutions.

Provisions attempting to reduce moral hazard in the Bridge Loans targeted the activities of
management in the public eye, which imposed a kind of penance on behalf of management.
Similar to firms participating in the Capital Purchase Program (CPP),27 auto companies
receiving funds from Bridge Loans under the TARP were required to restrict what are known
as golden parachutes. Bridge Loans documents contained a definition of golden parachutes
broader than the CPP definition. For the CPP, golden parachutes were defined as “payments
of more than three times an executive’s average base compensation from a firm over the five
most recent years in the event of the official’s involuntary termination, or bankruptcy or
receivership of a financial institution” (Treasury 2009f, 28395). The Bridge Loan documents
defined golden parachutes as “any payment in the nature of compensation to (or for the
benefit of) an SEO [Senior Executive Officer] made on account of an applicable severance
from employment” [emphasis added]” (Chrysler and Treasury 2009, PDF p. 58).
The Bridge Loan documents also banned incentive compensation for the 25 most highly paid
employees of GM and Chrysler, which goes beyond the restrictions placed on other TARP
recipients by late 2008 (Canis et al. 2009, 69–71). This more aggressive measure may reflect
a response to the increasing public outrage at “what many perceived to be excessively large
bonuses paid to executives from other firms receiving TARP money” (Canis et al. 2009, 71).

The CPP was a capital injection program for financial institutions conducted by Treasury between late 2008
and December 2009 (Treasury 2015).
27
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The Bridge Loans also contained a provision forcing Chrysler and GM to divest from all
private aircraft, a restriction on a kind of executive compensation, which may have been
meant to satisfy the public’s desire to punish executives for their actions during their first
public requests for public aid in November 2008 (Chrysler and Treasury 2009, PDF p. 59;
GM and Treasury 2008, PDF p. 10). On this early trip, the auto executives had traveled to
Washington, DC, in separate private jets, an action widely reported on in the media, which
made the private jets a symbol of corporate excess. That said, the Bridge Loans left room for
corporate travel policies that allowed chartered flights “when supported by a business
rationale” (Vlasic 2010).
19.

Treasury had the exclusive right to turn the loans into debtor-in-possession
loans in the event of a bankruptcy filing.

The Bridge Loans anticipated the bankruptcy of the borrowers by providing that in the event
of a bankruptcy filing the Treasury could elect to convert the Bridge Loans into debtor-inpossession (DIP) loans (GM and Treasury 2008, PDF p. 112; Canis et al. 2009, 53–54). In
bankruptcies, DIP loans (by definition, loans made to the debtor after a bankruptcy filing)
provide the bankrupt organization with the working capital to survive while moving through
the bankruptcy process (Canis et al. 2009, 53–54). DIP loans enjoy extremely high priority.
If a debtor can demonstrate that it could not secure financing by any other means, a
bankruptcy court can authorize a debtor to grant liens to the DIP lender that are senior to
liens of all the pre-bankruptcy creditors. In theory, Treasury’s ability to convert the bridge
loans to DIP loans would enable it to maintain, or increase, the priority of its loans if one of
the borrower companies went into bankruptcy.
Conversion would increase the likelihood that Treasury’s loans would be paid ahead of the
other secured creditors, increasing returns to the taxpayers. However, the Congressional
Research Service concluded that this conversion provision would go against the very
purpose of DIP loans, and even the key tenets of the bankruptcy process, which require that
senior creditors be paid before junior creditors (Canis et al. 2009, 54). The converted
Bridge/DIP loans would not provide GM or Chrysler with additional working capital, they
would keep the bankruptcy court from relieving the debtor of its pre-bankruptcy debts, and
they would negatively impact other creditors. Ultimately, the Bridge Loans were not
converted to DIP loans and Treasury provided new DIP funding to both companies under a
Joint DIP Facility with Export Development Canada, Canada’s export credit agency (COP
2009b, 23–31)
The value of the DIP conversion right was also disputed by at least one commenter.
According to Levitin (2008), the courts might reject the provision as an executory contract
under 11 U.S.C. §365(c)(2) of the Bankruptcy Code or draw the Treasury into a fight for lien
priority in a 11 U.S.C. §364 hearing. If the provision held up in court, GM and Chrysler might
have found it more difficult to find additional DIP financing for the restructuring (Canis et al.
2009, 53–54). Although Levitin (2008) contemplated the government’s converting the loan
into a DIP loan through a rollup refinancing or a cross-collateralization, he noted that this
would probably result in “sharp litigation.” It is difficult to say whether these criticisms
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would have come to fruition, because the government did not use the DIP loan conversion
provision and obtained senior liens through other tactics.
20.

The Bridge Loans involved significant coordination between the US and Canada.

The transnational nature of American auto manufacturing meant that the GM auto
companies also advocated for access to foreign government aid for their foreign subsidiaries
in 2008 and 2009 (see Embassy Berlin 2009). Perhaps because of these efforts, the Canadian
government collaborated with both the outgoing Bush administration and president-elect
Obama’s transition team before the December 19, 2008, announcements of the Bridge Loan
commitments (Wilson 2008).
On the same day as the Bush administration announced the Bridge Loans, there was an
announcement of similar support to General Motors of Canada and Chrysler Canada by the
Canadian and Ontario governments. The aid to the Canadian subsidiaries was for 20% of the
amount offered to the US auto companies by the US government (C$4 billion, or $3.28
billion).28 The C$4 billion commitment was never drawn. It was replaced with other
assistance measures in spring 2009, when the Canadian subsidiaries requested C$10 billion
in aid from central and provincial governments. In response, Canada committed C$1 billion
in financing for Chrysler Canada (Chrysler Canada drew on C$250 million of this
commitment) and C$3 billion for General Motors of Canada (Export Development Canada
2009, 4; Industry Canada 2009). However, there was extremely limited documentation of
the mechanics of how the lending to General Motors of Canada was used (Office of the
Auditor General of Canada 2014). The Canadian government continued to use this 20%
proportion when deciding the assistance to the two companies throughout 2009 (Export
Development Canada, 4). GM evidently did not pledge all of its foreign subsidiaries as
collateral, which the US government was aware of and mentioned in at least one diplomatic
cable (Consulate General Shanghai 2008).29
21.

Treasury worked closely with GM on revising its plan.

When the President’ Designee determined, on March 30, 2009, that GM’s Restructuring Plan
was not viable, its auto team adopted a policy of working closely with GM to produce a “more
aggressive plan” (Rattner 2010, 208–210; COP 2009b, 1–3; Treasury 2009e). While Treasury
worked closely with GM in negotiating terms with stakeholders and helping to revise their
plans, Treasury attempted to ensure that it did not appear that the government was itself
producing or revising the plans.
This approach might not have been in line with a bailout best practice identified by the
General Accounting Office in 1984, which noted:

Exchange rate of 1.21 CAN-USD (Office of the Auditor General of Canada 2014)
The GM Loan and Security Agreement (LSA) lists the broad companies that they did pledge, but the list of
companies excluded from the collateral (which could or might have included a number of subsidiaries of
companies that they did pledge) was redacted (GM and Treasury 2008, PDF pp. 141–142, 184–190, 206–212)
28
29
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When the government rejects a proposed plan or contract because it is too risky, it
should require the firm’s or municipality’s management to make changes and
resubmit the proposal, but the government should not attempt to develop its own
plans and impose them on management. To do so could leave the government
responsible for the outcome (57).
22.

The Bridge Loans contained termination provisions—in other words, Treasury
had an exit strategy in case of a default.

The Bridge Loans contained numerous terms that terminated the lending facility with the
two automakers. The Bridge Loans terminated upon any “Events of Default,” which the two
Loan and Security Agreements (LSAs) defined broadly (Chrysler and Treasury 2009, PDF p.
64; GM and Treasury 2008, PDF p. 110-112). Once terminated, the relevant borrower would
have to repay “the aggregate principal amount of all Advances then outstanding under the
Note, together with all interest thereon and fees and out-of-pocket expenses of the Lender”
by the thirtieth day after the Certification Deadline, when the outstanding amounts would
become “become due and payable […] without any further action on the part of the Lender”
(Chrysler and Treasury 2009, PDF p. 28; GM and Treasury 2008, PDF p. 74).
23.

Treasury followed a pattern of transparency in communicating about the
Bridge Loans.

Treasury made most of the documents underpinning the Bridge Loans and its lending
activities associated with Bridge Loans public on its website (Chrysler and Treasury 2009;
GM and Treasury 2008; Treasury 2018). It also issued a few press releases on the
Presidential Task Force on the Auto Industry’s activities and on its determinations regarding
the February viability plans (Treasury 2009c; Treasury 2009a; Treasury 2009b). The latter
explained the government’s thinking on how an effective restructuring process would
proceed as well as on the problems with the February viability plans.

III. Evaluation
Commentators acknowledge that the two auto companies did survive the presidential
transition as a result of the aid and, with an extension and additional assistance from the
Treasury, Restructuring Plans for their long-term viability were produced. The
Congressional Oversight Panel (2011) concluded that there is little doubt that GM and
Chrysler would have faced the prospect of bankruptcy and liquidation in absence of
government aid (115). This is also the position of former government officials involved in
the bailout (see Goolsbee and Krueger 2015, 9). However, two members of the Congressional
Oversight Panel, in concurring opinions, disagreed with this conclusion. They argued that a
private-sector reorganization with some potential debtor-in-possession financing from the
government could have secured the necessary resources for restructuring. They argued that
such a restructuring would have been possible before the private sector was spooked by
signals of an impending government bailout (COP 2011, 122).
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Ultimately, the pressure of the initial restructuring plan requirements and the timeline put
forward by the Bush administration did not extract viable restructuring plans from the
companies. The government had to take a hands-on role in developing the plans and commit
additional working capital to keep the companies afloat during the process (Rattner 2010,
157–159, 186–187).
Other commentary on the Bridge Loans addressed Treasury’s transparency in administering
the Bridge Loans, the legality of the Bridge Loans, and the effectiveness of provisions meant
to protect taxpayers.
The Congressional Oversight Panel (2009b) stated that Treasury’s public statements were
relatively vague on what the primary purpose of the Bridge Loan portion of the bailout was,
but this complaint was also applied to the auto bailout as a whole (4). This was not in line
with the 1984 General Accounting Office recommendations for the rescue of large firms,
which emphasized that goals and objectives should “identify intended benefits, including
expected levels of attainment; identify unavoidable adverse consequences or […] unintended
benefits, […] include to the extent possible measures of desired degree of attainment; and
provide guidance to administrators on how to make trade-offs among conflicting aims” (37).
As for the legality of the aid, some argue that by interpreting EESA broadly enough to justify
aid to the auto companies, the Bush and then the Obama administrations went beyond
Congress’s intent, which was for EESA to assist the financial industry (COP 2009b, 78–79).
The Congressional Oversight Panel (2009b) was not sanguine about the legality of using
TARP funds, as they said that the debate over AIFRA showed EESA was never intended to
cover automobile companies; Congress would not have had to debate AIFRA if it had (78–
79). Ultimately, this legality question hinged on a provision of TARP that gave the Secretary
of Treasury significant discretion when determining whether a financial institution was
systemically important (those being the institutions eligible for TARP funds).
Others noted that the Bridge Loans might have been a violation of the World Trade
Organization’s (WTO) Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (Benson 2009,
117–118). This could have exposed the US to countervailing duties from abroad or cases
before the WTO’s dispute settlement mechanism (Benson 2009, 117–118). One reason for
this is that the loans to the two companies were provided at significantly below-market rates
(Brunel and Hufbauer 2009, 7). However, a WTO case might have triggered tit-for-tat
countervailing tariffs, and the environmental terms of the Restructuring Plans would make
bringing a WTO case extremely controversial (Brunel and Hufbauer 2009, 7–8).
In the days before the Treasury executed the Bridge Loans, bankruptcy law commentator
Adam Levitin (2009) argued that several terms in the Chrysler agreement would not have
provided sufficient protection for taxpayer funds. While the loans were supposed to be
secured under the Bridge Loans’ terms related to collateral, they predominantly created
junior liens that were likely to “be underwater from the start” in the case of Chrysler. He also
argued that the government could have secured higher-quality collateral in negotiations
before the Bridge Loans for Chrysler were executed. Levitin also speculated that the low-
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quality collateral the government actually received senior liens on would have such a limited
liquidation value that it could only protect taxpayers through its hostage value.
There are also several criticisms directed at the government’s exit from its stake in Chrysler
Financial’s profits. As with the auto bailout as a whole, the Congressional Oversight Panel
(2011) felt that the government’s exit from Chrysler Financial had transparency problems.
However, the Congressional Oversight Panel also faulted Treasury for carrying out limited
due diligence in its decision to exit Chrysler Financial, describing the exit as “hasty” (2). The
Congressional Oversight Panel went on to claim that Treasury appeared to have sacrificed
“taxpayer returns […] in favor of an unnecessarily accelerated exit” (2).
In general, however, the decision to rescue the auto companies seems to have been viewed
positively. Public opinion on the Bridge Loans is difficult to judge, as multiple lending
programs were layered on top of the Bridge Loans to provide a more comprehensive funding
structuring over time. In December 2008, 60% of consumers surveyed agreed “that the US
government should keep loaning money to GM and Chrysler,” but this number dropped to
25% in February 2009 before gradually climbing to 38% by June 2014 (Wallace 2014; First
Research 2009, PDF p. 4). Although UAW leadership was initially upset about the required
concessions and hoped that they would be retracted by the president-elect, they later
supported the bailout process (Canis et al. 2009, 11).

IV.
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